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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A-2/4/74 
I n t h e M a t t e r of 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
R e s p o n d e n t , 
- a n d -
ASSOCIATION OF "LABORATORY" PROFESSIONALS', 
Charging Party. 
This case comes before us on exceptions of both the 
charging party, Association of Laboratory Professionals, and the 
respondent,. City of New York, to a decision and recommended order 
of a hearing officer issued,on November 13, 1973. That decision 
found merit in one part and no merit in another part of a charge 
filed by the Association of Laboratory Professionals on February 
20, 1973 with the Office of Collective Bargaining of the City of 
New York. The charge was that the City of New York - Department 
of Health, had violated §1173-4.2 (a) (1) and (2) of the New York 
City Collective Bargaining Law in that the City had improperly (1) 
required the removal of a notice, publicizing the charging party's 
organizational drive from its bulletin.boards, and. (2) revoked 
permission previously granted to the charging party to hold an 
organizational'meeting on its premises.. 
When, on March 1, 1973, the authority of the Office of 
Collective Bargaining to prevent improper practices, terminated 
and this agency was left with exclusive jurisdiction over .such 
conduct, the matter was transferred from the Office of Collective 
Bargaining to us. The hearing officer treated the charge as if. it 
had alleged a violation of CSL §209-a.l (a) and (b), which gen-
erally parallel the cited provisions of the New York City 
Collective Bargaining Law. The hearing officer was correct in so 
construing the charge and in treating the provisions of the New 
York City Collective Bargaining Law as being the same as' the 
BOARD DECISION 
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parallel provisions of the Taylor Law. CSL §209-a is one of the 
sections of the Taylor Law that has applied in New York City 
iirectl.y and has not been subject to substitution by a sub-
1 
stantially equivalent alternative. 
FACTS 
Few of the facts are in dispute. During the period of 
unchallengedrepresentation1 -status-—-that -is-,- -at- a--time-when--the- •-
status of Local 144, SEIU, which was the certified representative 
2 
of certain employees of respondent, was not open to challenge — 
some employees in the unit represented by SEIU became dissatisfied 
with that organization. During December 1972, they posted a notice 
an one or more of respondent's" bulletin boards calling for like-
ninded persons to join the charging party, a competing employee 
Drganizatibn. The building in which most of the employees within 
the negotiating unit worked contained from.10.to 15 non-enclosed 
bulletin boards on which, for many years, employees had posted 
notices of all types, including those relating to meetings of 
social, religious and, ethnic organizations. On December 11, SEIU 
wrote to Mr. Rosenberg, respondent's Director of Labor Relations for 
' . ' • • ' • ' • • i 
the Health Services Administration, protesting the posting of the 
I • ' 
notice. Mr. Rosenberg, on receipt of .the incumbent's protest, 
called Dr. May, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Laboratories. He 
called him because he had been told that the "notices [that] had 
been posted on the bulletin,board [referred to] ...City facilities, 
the City address, the City telephone number, for the purpose of 
I 
organizing microbiologists who are already represented by 
Local 144." Two days later, Dr. May wrote a memorandum to 
the charging party requiring the removal of these notices. His 
1. CSL §212.. 
2_ CSL §208.2 and §2.7 of t h e r e v i s e d conso l ida t ed Rules of OCB. 
i 
' ' • - •• ' i 
i j 
i 
I 
1 
^99 '1 I 
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stated reason was that the form of notice violated respondent's 
oolicy in that it referred to respondent's address and telephone 
3 ' ' -
number. _ 
On January 29, 1972, a month after the removal of 
the notice, Mr. Rosenberg explained his reasoning when he wrote' 
Dr. May "...that it is-contrary to City policy to permit the 
Association of "Laboratory"PfofesslbhaTs the"'use"of"City 
property to assist them in soliciting members from among those 
smployees in the Bacteriologist and Microbiologist title series 
...[W]e will not permit the use of City property to carry out 
'raids' on the members of a.union duly certified by the Office 
Df Collective Bargaining to represent all employees in the 
aforementioned titles." This is not the reason given by Dr. May 
in his memorandum and we cannot attribute Mr. Rosenberg's 
motivation to him. On the record we cannot determine, and could 
only guess, whether a notice not referring to respondent's 
address or telephone numbers would have been permitted to remain 
on the bulletin board. 
3 The memorandum stated: 
"You are hereby directedyto immediately desist • 
from the formal use of the address of the Public 
Health, Laboratories building, 455 First Avenue 
and the use of telephone numbers 340-4724 and 
4725 assigned to the Laboratories. 
Such use of official city telephone numbers 
and facilities for union organizing activity 
is contrary to City regulations. • 
You are further directed to remove all 
announcements with the above information from 
bulletin boards in any premises occupied by 
the Laboratories." 
i 
•• , i 
• .' • . i 
3224) 
! 
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The facts involving that part of the charge relating to 
the cancellation of the meeting are clear. In addition to pro-
4 
fviding meeting space to SEIU pursuant to contractual obligation, 
respondent had a long-standing practice of giving its employees 
space for "professional" purposes. After being alerted by SEIU 
that the meeting was for labor relations purposes, and having 
confirmed this by its own investigation, respondent withdrew the 
right to hold the meeting. 
DISCUSSION • • 
The legal problem is one of balancing conflicting and 
protected rights of the public employer and its employees. The 
public employer has property rights that extend to its meeting 
rooms, its bulletin boards, its address-, and its telephone. The 
employees have "the right, to form, join and participate in, or to 
refrain from forming, joining or participating in, any employee 
. 5 
organization of their own choosing." These rights come into 
conflict when employees attempt, while on the property of their 
employer, to organize for the purpose of forming or rejecting an 
employee organization. Through the years there have' been many-
occasions for the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal 
courts to adjudicate questions involving this balance. We turn to 
the reasoning of these decisions for the help that they may provide. 
Generally they consider such factors as the availability to the 
organizers of alternative means.of reaching the employees, whether 
the organizers are outsiders or fellow employees, whether the 
organizational activities have been attempted during working time 
or in working areas, the extent to which the conduct involved in 
4 The dontract did not make this right exclusive. 
5 CSL §202. 
3225 
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the organizing activities departs from universally enforced norms 
of the employer, and the extent to which the organizing activities 
interfere with.productivity and discipline. • "The employer may not 
affirmatively interfere with organization? the union may not always 
1 . insist that the employer aid organization." 
7_ 
In National Steel Corp. v. NLRB, the 6th Circuit found 
a greater right to distribute union literature on the employer's 
premises-during- non-working-times--and in. non-working areas when the 
distribution was being made by employees, rather than by non-emplcyes 
organizers. It noted that "[wjhat is involved is not only the 
union's desire to reach employees, but also the right of employees 
to communicate with other employees". Of particular relevance to 
the problem before us was that court's concern for the right of 
employees to organize "... during this crucial period when the union 
was attempting to gather .sufficient.strength to make the showing 
8 _ 
[of interest]...". In Cooper Tire and Rubber Co. v. NLRB, " the 6th 
Circuit also ruled that an overbroad regulation prohibiting distri-
bution of literature could no more be used to prevent criticism of 
union leadership by employees unhappy with the quality of their 
representation than to prevent an initial organizing campaign. 
- , It is not the implication of the Cooper Tire and Rubber 
Co. case that no distinctions can be made between a certified 
employee organization and one that enjoys no such status'. The New 
York. State Court of Appeals has upheld such a distinction. Even 
before the enactment of the Taylor Law and its requirement that 
public employers deduct membership dues on behalf of recognized and 
certified "employee organizations from the wages of their employees 
who authorize such deductions, the court ruled in Bauch v. City of 
jg NLRB.v. Babcock and Wilcox, 351 US 105, 112 (1956). 
5 415 P 2d 1231 (1969). 
§ 443 F 2d 338 (1971). 
mm 
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New York, 21 NY 2d 599 (1968), cert.den. 393 US 834 (1969), that a 
public employer may contract with a certified union to give it 
exclusive dues check-off privileges. There are several distinctions 
between the circumstances before the Court of Appeals in Bauch and 
those before us. The employer in Bauch was contractually obligated 
to .give to.the certified employee organization exclusive dues 
check-off rights; respondent was not contractually obligated to 
give to SEIU exclusive use of bulletin boards. The right given to 
the certified organization in Bauch was a valuableTorganizational 
right, but it did not interfere with the right of employees to 
communicate with other employees; the denial to the charging party 
did. The relief/sought by Bauch would have obligated the public 
employer to extend itself on behalf of a noncertified employee 
organization; while this was true in the instant case insofar as 
the charging party sought meeting rooms, it was not true insofar as 
the charging party sought the use of bulletin boards. The bulletin 
boards had previously been made available to all employees indis-
criminately — with no effort made by the respondent to police 
them — so that nothing was required of the respondent except to 
maintain its existing practice. 
The National Labor Relations Board has also dealt with 
the issue of an employer that removed notices of union meetings 
from bulletin boards on which it had permitted "employees to post 
...notices of various types, including notices relating to social 
• K 
and religious affairs and meetings ,of charitable organizations...." 
9_:. Challenge Cook Brothers of Ohio, Inc. , 153 NLRB 92, 99 (1965), 
enforced NLRB v. Challenge-Cook Brothers of Ohio, 374'F 2d 14 7 
(6th Cir., 1967). The NLRB adopted the opinion.of a trial 
examiner who had stated: • 
"I have no doubt that if the Respondent had consistently 
not allowed its employees to use the bulletin boards to 
publicize their personal affairs, the Respondent could 
properly have prohibited the posting of notices of union 
meetings. But that is not our set of facts. The question, 
I' believe, is whether the Respondent, having made its 
bulletin boards available to employees for posting of 
notices relating to social and religious affairs, as well 
as meetings of charitable organizations, could validly . 
discriminate against notices of union meetings which 
employees had posted. According to the General Counsel, 
'the [Respondent's.] act of singling out the union- notices 
for removal' constitutes interference with the employees' 
organizational rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1). The 
General Counsel's position is supported by authority." 
OOO^i 
I 
! 
i 
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It found the denial to a union of bulletin board privileges enjoyed 
by other organizations to constitute unlawful discrimination. 
The reasoning of these decisions does not compel an 
employer, under the circumstances herein, to make available to an 
employee organization the use of its mailing address or its tele-
phones. Contrariwise, if an employer were to permit the use of 
such , facilities^ this mijght ;_consJtita - . 
In balancing the property rights of the employer against 
the organizational rights of the employees .in the context of all 
the circumstances, we conclude that, ' 
(1) respondent did not act- improperly when it denied 
to charging party the use of its premises for 
meeting rooms, such rooms having previously been 
made available to employees only pursuant to 
contract or when respondent believed that it 
might reap some work-related benefit from the 
• meeting; 
(2) respondent did not act improperly when it 
denied to charging party the use of its 
bulletin boards to post a notice that 
included the mailing address and the telephone. 
numbers of respondent as a return address for 
10 
' the charging party. 
10 A notice that contained no reference to respondent's address 
and telephone-numbers or to its other property would have been 
entitled' to> a place on the bulletin board. On January 13, 197 3 
a1 second notice was prepared by charging party and it was not 
posted, but the record does not indicate that permission to 
post was refused. Moreover, that notice, too, was objectionable 
because it announced a meeting on respondent's premises. 
Respondent has expressed concern that notices- posted by a 
challenging employee organization might be inflammatory, and 
thus disruptive of production or discipline. There is no 
evidence in this record that the posting of the notice in this 
case was either disruptive or was calculated to be disruptive. 
Board - U-0919 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the charge should 
be, and hereby is; DISMISSED. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
February 4., 1974 . /^ ^~\ 
-8 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2B-2/4/74 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent, 
-and-
SECURITY UNIT EMPLOYEES-, COUNCIL 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
This case comes to us on.an appeal from the decision of 
a hearing officer dismissing the charge on the ground that it 
fails to state a violation of CSL §209-a.l. • The charge filed 
by the Security Unit Employees, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
alleges an ostensible violation of CSL §209-a.l (a), (b), (c) 
and (d), resulting from 
"[t]he actions of the Chief Executive 
j Officer of the State of New.York, in 
signing into law Chapter 382 of the Laws 
of 1973." (emphasis added) 
The underlying facts are that on May 31, 1973 the 
Governor of the State of New York signed into law Chapter 382 of 
the Laws of 1973 which retroactively, as of April 1, 1973, 
amended CSL §201.4 so as to prohibit negotiation o£, and to void 
any subsequent agreement on retirement benefits. At the time 
there was a collective agreement between the charging party and 
the State of New York which included a reopener for the nego-
tiation of retirement benefits, such benefits to become effective 
no earlier than April I, 1973. 
Having ascertained at the opening of the hearing that the 
sole circumstance claimed to be a violation of CSL §2 09-a.l^was 
the act of the Governor in signing the bill that became L. 1973, 
c. 382, the hearing officer granted a motion to dismiss the 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
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charge. He reasoned, 
"[T]he Governor's action '...in signing into 
law Chapter 382 of the Laws of 1973'—and 
his reasons for same, are legislative in 
nature (footnote omitted). It must then 
follow that the Governor's constitutional 
mandate to approve or veto'legislative bills 
cannot be abrogated by statute and certainly 
not by an administrative decision of this 
tribunal." -
-The charging- party-has--fil-ed -exceptions1 to that- decision; -•-
arguing, 
1. that the hearing officer was without authority to 
dismiss the charge at the outset of the hearing, and 
2. that the charge alleges violations of the Taylor 
Law that are within our jurisdiction. 
We find no merit in these exceptions. The first exception , 
derives from language of CSL §2.05.5 (d) , that this "board 
shall exercise exclusive nondelegable jurisdiction of the 
. [procedures for the prevention of improper employer and employee 
organization practices as provided in section two hundred nine-a 
of this>article]...". The charging party concedes that we can 
assign a member of our staff to hold a hearing and to issue 
intermediate decisions'and recommended orders, but argues that 
the dismissal of the charge by a hearing officer prior to the 
holding of a hearing is improper. This posture misconceives the 
nature of the hearing. Hearings are held to produce evidence and 
to provide a means for resolving' conflicts in such evidence. 
When there is no dispute between the' parties as to the material 
facts, no purpose is served by conducting a hearing. In the 
instant proceeding,.once the hearing officer ascertained that the 
charging party was relying only upon' the fact that the Governor j 
signed into law Chapter 382 of the Laws of 1973, there was no 
further need for a hearing. All that remained was for the 
hearing officer to issue his decision and recommended order in 
the same manner that he would, after a hearing, in a case in which 
39.31 
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allegations of fact were in .conflict. As in all cases, this 
Board must exercise its exclusive, nondelegable responsibility 
thereafter if the parties do not accept the hearing officer's 
decision and recommended order. 
As to., the charging party's second exception, we confirm 
the hearing officer's conclusion of law that the function of the 
Governor in signing a bill into law is legislative in nature'and 
not subject to challenge before this Board. 
Accordingly, the charge in this matter is hereby DISMISSED 
in its entirety. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
February '.4, 1974 
Sbert D. Helsby/ Chairman 
Fred L. Denson 
oaaft 
<\S~A-L. 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2C-2/4/74 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF YONKERS, 
Respondentj 
-and-
YONKERS CROSSING GUARDS UNIT, 
WESTCHESTER CHAPTER, CSEA, INC., 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-O-639 
This case comes before us on the exceptions of the 
respondent City of Yohkers to a decision of a hearing officer 
finding it in violation of CSL §209-a.l (d) in that it failed 
to respond promptly to a.negotiating proposal made .by the charging I 
party, Yonkers Crossing Guards Unit, Westchester Chapter. CSEA, j 
I •. J 
Inc. 
Pacts 
Although the testimony was not undisputed, the hearing 
officer resolved questions of credibility and concluded that 
between June 22, 1972, when the charging•party made a proposal for 
a complete agreement that respondent's negotiator undertook to • 
s 
submit to the City Manager for approval, and August 15, 1972 when 
rejection of that proposal was communicated to the charging party, 
the charging party had. net been informed that the proposed settle-
ment was unacceptable to the City. The June 22 proposal had come 
after lengthy negotiations extending, almost a year beyond the 
expiration of the prior contract. During the course of those 
negotiations, tentative agreement had been reached on a two-year 
The hearing officer rejected the allegations of the charging 
party -that respondent had refused to implement a fully nego-
tiated agreement and that it had violated the law when it failed 
to invest its negotiator with sufficient authority to enter into 
an agreement. The charging party did not file exceptions. 
^m 
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contract and on all the provisions thereof except on the amount of 
the salary Increases. . The proposal made by the charging party on 
June 22 related to the salary increases. Respondent's negotiator 
knew that the charging party expected its proposal to be accepted 
and was anxious to present it to its membership for ratification 
as.soon as possible; he undertook to give the charging party a 
quick answer as to whether the City Manager would approve the 
proposed contract. • ' 
We determine that the hearing officer's findings of fact 
are supported by the record. In applying the law to those facts, 
•he said, ' 
"After lengthy negotiations extending nearly twelve 
. .months beyond the expiration of the prior contract, 
the failure of the City to promptly notify CSEA 
until August 15, that .it could not accept the 
economic package negotiated, and recommended by its 
chief negotiator more than eight weeks earlier 
was clearly dilatory, (footnote omitted)'.' 
We endorse his conclusion of law that, under the circumstances, it 
constituted a failure to negotiate in good faith for respondent 
not to have communicated with the charging party sooner regarding 
its rejection of the agreement. 
NOW, .THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the City of Yonkers cease 
• ' and desist from failing to respond 
i 
promptly to negotiating proposals. 
In all other respects, the charge Should be, 
and hereby is, DISMISSED. . 
2 it had been understood that all partial agreements, were contingi 
upon there being a final 'agreement on a total package. 
3_ The hearing officer had recommended that' we order respondent to 
resume negotiations in good faith upon request. Such an order i 
no longer appropriate because the parties have already done so 
and have concluded an agreement. 
STATE OF NEW YOSX 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-2/4/74 
I n t h e M a t t e r o f 
CITY OP YONKERS, 
R e s p o n d e n t , 
-and-
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-0841 
YONKERS CROSSING GUARDS UNIT, 
WESTCHESTER CHAPTER "CiviL~~SERVICE- -
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
This case comes before us on exceptions filed by the 
Yonkers Crossing Guards Unit of the Westchester Chapter of CSEA 
(hereinafter CSEA) to a hearing officer's decision dismissing its 
charge. The charge, filed on April 26, 1973, had alleged that 
the City of Yonkers,had violated CSL §209-a.l (a) and (d) in that 
it had unilaterally withdrawn'a policy of paying annual wage incre-
ments to its crossing guards. ..The policy of paying increments ' 
derived from a collective agreement negotiated between CSEA and 
the City of Yonkers which had expired on June 30, 1971. Negoti-
ations for a successor agreement had not yielded a successor 
contract as of the time of the closing of the record herein.-
The allegedly improper unilateral decision to withdraw its policy 
of paying increments had been made in advance of January 1, 19 72 
when an annual increment would have been due and was known to the 
crossing guards and to CSEA immediately thereafter, inasmuch as. 
the increments were not paid. Pursuant to the employer's unilater-
ally imposed policy, no increments were paid on January 1, 1973 
either. 
1 These negotiations- have been the subject of another charge 
filed by CSEA on September 17, 1972 alleging bad faith nego-
tiations (Case No. U-0639). 
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The hearing officer noted the sixteen-month interval from 
January 1972, when (1) the unilateral withdrawal of the increment 
policy became a matter of public knowledge and (2) anticipated 
increments were not paid, to April 1973, when the charge was 
2 
filed, and he dismissed the charge because it was not timely. 
The thrust of CSEA's exceptions is that the. City of Yonkers 
failure to pay the increments is a continuing violation, being 
renewed" with each" "and every paycheck", and" is thus- not: barred by -
our four-month timeliness provision. In support of this posture, i 
it cites court .decisions relating to the duty of a city to pay 
wages required by law. Those court decisions are not apposite; 
CSEA's citation of them reflects a misunderstanding of the duty of 
an employer not to alter terms and conditions of employment uni-
laterally during the course of negotiations. This duty, as enun-
ciated by us In the Matter of Triborough Bridge and Tunnel 
3 
Authority, is not directly concerned with whether an employer 
must provide benefits that were required by a contract after the 
expiration of that contract, but before a successor agreement has 
been reached.. Whether or not contractual obligations survive a 
contract are matters of law.and contract interpretation to be 
resolved by the courts and/or an arbitrator. While the Triborough 
Doctrine may, in some instances, reach this question indirectly, 
its primary concern is elsewhere. CSL §§209-a and 205.5 (d) are 
designed to protect the representation, and negotiation rights of 
public employees, and to guarantee that public employers and 
public employee organizations negotiate in good faith. In 
Triborough we addressed ourselves .to the statutory prohibition that 
• ' 
a public employer may not "refuse to negotiate in good faith with 
the duly recognized or certified representatives of its public 
employees."; we explained the duty to negotiate in good faith as 
2 Section 204.1 (a) of our Rules provides that "[A] charge that 
any public employer.. ..has engaged in or is engaging in an 
improper practice may be filed with the Director within four 
months thereof...." 
3 5 PERB 3064 (1972)". 
Board - U-0 841 '* ' .' -3 
precluding a unilateral change in working conditions during the 
4 
course of negotiations.— Indeed, we emphasized the irrelevance of 
the question that would ordinarily come before a court or an 
arbitrator, to wit, the validity of the provision of the expired 
contract, saying, 
"It is of no consequence that the employee benefit 
withdrawn by respondent derived from an expired 
agreement. Our decision would be the same if 
during the course of negotiations an employer 
: .-unilateral-ly-.withdrew; „su.eh„an_.employee„ benefit 
that had been previously enjoyed by the employees 
even if there had been no prior contractual duty 
to furnish the benefit."— 
A violation of an obligation to pay an increment might 
be a continuing one, but it is not a violation that comes before 
us under CSL s 209-a. The Taylor Law violation, if any, was a 
failure to negotiate in good faith. It would have been 
perpetrated when the City, of Yonkers unilaterally decided to 
withdraw an employee benefit during the'course of negotiations, or 
when it did first actually withdraw such benefit; the'time to 
seek redress of such a violation began to run in January 1972 
when the employee organization, became or should have become 
aware of the circumstances that might have constituted the 
violation. 
£ CSL §§ 205.5 (d) and 209-a were enacted two years after passage 
of the Taylor Law because the'Legislature recognized the 
volatile nature of labor relations and the inadequacy of 
court and arbitral proceedings to defuse some potential 
explosions. PERB was given "exclusive nondelegable jurisdiction 
over these matters, which were called improper practices. 
5 5 PERB at 3065. 
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Accordingly, we do not reach the question of whether 
there has been a violation because we find that the charge is 
not timely and we dismiss it in its entirety. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
February 4, 1974 
'Robert D. Helsby/Chairman 
Fred L. Denson 
32:18 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2E-2/4/74 
Case No. C-1018 
In the Matter of 
THE GRIFFITH INSTITUTE AND CENTRAL' 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SPRINGVILLE, NEW YORKf, 
Employer,
 : 
- and -
SPRINGVILLE EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYEES : 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, ' 
- and -
SERVICE EMPLOYEES' INTERNATIONAL UNION : 
LOCAL 227, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
'"'" CERTIFICATION OF' REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected? 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that SPRINGVILLE EDUCATIONAL 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
has been designated and selected by a,majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
PERB 58( 
Included: All full-time and part-time head custodians, 
custodians, groundsmen, matron, cleaners, cook 
managers—cafeteria, cooks, food service helpers, 
carpenters, electrician/plumber, mechanics, 
bus drivers. 
Excluded: School lunch manager/food service directors, 
transportation supervisor, supervisor of 
maintenance and all other employees of the 
employer. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with SPRINGVILLE EDUCATIONAL 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 4th day of February 19 74 
ROBERT D. HELSBY/ Chairman 
2-68) FRED L. DENSON 
&m 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD #2F-2/4/74 
In the Matter of the Application of the 
TOWN OF OYSTER BAY 
for a Determination pursuant to. Section 
212 of the Civil Service Law. 
Docket No. S-0019 
At a meeting of the Public Employment Relations Board 
held on the 4th day of February, 1974-, and after consideration 
of the application of the Town of Oyster Bay made pursuant to Sec-
tion 212 of the Civil Service Law for a determination that Local 
Law No. 6-1967 as last amended by Local Law No. 5-1973 is sub-
stantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth 
in Article 14 of the Civil Service Law with respect to the State 
and to the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, it is 
ORDERED, that said'application be and same hereby is 
approved upon the determination of the Board that the Local Law 
aforementioned, as amended, is substantially equivalent to the 
provisions and procedures set forth in Article 14 of the Civil 
Service Law with respect to the State and to the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Public Employment Relations Board. 
Dated, Albany,. New York 
February 4, 1974 
ROBERT D. HELSBY,.Chairman 
J I / S E P / R . CR( OWLEY 
irjhop-— 
FRED L . DENSON 
January 30, 1974 
. ' . . - ' . #3B-2/4/74 
TO: PERB 
FROM: Martin L. Barr 
RE: William B.Martin, Sheriff of Ulster County 
v. Ulster County Unit of Ulster County Chapter 
of the CSEA, Inc. Case U-0805 . 
In Case U-0805 by decision and order dated December 7, 
1973, this Board found that' the Sheriff of Ulster County 
had improperly refused to execute a contract reached 
between the CSEA and the County and Sheriff and ordered 
the Sheriff to execute such agreement. By letter dated 
January 16, 1974, the CSEA advises that' the contract 
embodying the terms and conditions agreed upon was for-
warded to the Sheriff and he has refused to execute such 
contract. CSEA requests this Board to seek judicial 
enforcement of the order. It appears that such an en-
forcement proceeding is warranted at this time. It is 
recommended that the Board authorize Counsel to institute 
a proceeding to enforce the order. 
MLB:ap 
